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lack of jurisdiction and to quash service of process
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SUMMA CORPORATION,
A California Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15149

LANCER INDUSTRIES, INC.,
An Illinois Corporation,
The General Partner of
Synergetics,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Synergetics, a Utah limited partnership, by and
through its general partner Lancer Industries, Inc., an Illinois
corporation, appeals the decision of the Third Judicial District
Court which denied Appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint
of the Respondent.
DISPOSITION In LOWER COURT
Appellant made its motion to dismiss the action on the grounds
that the court does not have jurisdiction of the person of Appellant
in this matter and that the Appellant was not served with process
in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion

to dismiss was denied by the court below.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the order of the lower court affirmed.
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STATEBENT OF FACTS
Respondent, SUI!lilla Corporation, entered into a contract with
Appellant, Synergetics, a Utah limit e d par t ners h'ip, on or abom
August 28, 1973 (R. 1).

The contract provided that Respondent

would perform a study concerning the optimum use of certain tract:
of real property located in Tampa, Florida (R. 8). Respondent
fully performed the services which were called for under the
contract, but after repeated demands did not receive payment
of its fee which totaled $16,347.24 (R. 1-2, 13).
Thereafter, Respondent brought suit in the Third Judicial
District Court of the state of Utah.

Appellant, Synergetics,

a Utah limited partnership, was served with process by means
of personal service upon the president, C. A. Bailey, of Lancer
Industries, the corporate general partner of the Utah limited
partnership.

Mr. Bailey is a resident of Utah.

Appellant moved to dismiss the action based upon the doctrini
of forum non conveniens and this motion was granted (R. 34).
Thereafter, Respondent appealed the dismissal to the Utah Supreme
Court which reversed the dismissal and held that the parties
should proceed to try the action on the merits (R. 46).
Appellant then filed another motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction over the person of Appellant.

This motion

to dismiss was denied by the Third Judicial District Court.
Synergetics is a Utah limited partnership and maintains
a place of business within the state of Utah (R. 58). In additio:
the president of the limited partnership's corporate general
·
·
h'is personal res.;dence
in the state of Utah
partner maintains
~
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and conducts certain business of the partnership here through
the use of the United States mails (R. 49).
Respondent is a corporation qualified to do business within
the state of Utah.

Respondent contends that the Utah forum is

a proper forum to assert in personam jurisdiction because Synergetics,

the Utah limited partnership, is an entity existing under the
auspices of Utah law, is a resident of Utah, maintains a principal
place of business in Utah, and was properly served with process
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURTS OF THIS STATE HAVE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP' WHICH HAS
FILED ITS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CERTIFICATE IN ORDER
TO OBTAIN THE BENEFIT AND PROTECTION OF UTAH LAW.
The Appellant herein is a Utah limited partnership.

Pur-

suant to 48-2-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953), the partnership filed
its certificate of limited partnership on September 20, 1971,
in Salt Lake County.

The Utah limited partnership certificate

stated that one of the partnership's two principal places of
business was 1600 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 57-58).
The question presented herein is the power of the courts
of this state to assert in personam jurisdiction over a Utah

resident, a business organization created under the auspices
of Utah law and which receives the benefits and protections of

that law.

The question presented herein is not whether the corpor-

ate general partner of the resident Utah limited partnership
has had sufficient "minimum contacts" to justify the imposition
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of in personam jurisdiction over it.

The cases cited by the

Appellant deal exclusively with the kinds of activities which
a foreign corporation or entity must engage in within a

particula:
state in order to subject the foreign entity to the jurisdiction
of that state's courts.

In this particular case, the limited

partnership is a Utah resident.
Appellant has thus confused the issue of in personam jurisdii
tion over the Utah partnership by its repeated references to
the scope of business of the general partner of this partnership
which is a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of the state of Illinois.

Appellant's argument under its first

point speaks exclusively to the issue of whether Lancer Industrie:
Inc. , the corporate general partner, has sufficient contact with
the state of Utah to subject Lancer to the jurisdiction of the
state's courts.

This, however, is not the narrow issue on appeal

here, which focuses on the court's power over the Utah limited
partnership.
A limited partnership has an existence separate and apart
from the members which compose it and is an entity as to all
matters germane to its interest.

Many jurisdictions regard even

a general. partnership as a separate and distinct legal entity.
Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P. 2d 191 (19W
C. H. Leavell & Company v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 450 P. 2d

211 (Okl. 1968).

As a distinct and separate legal entity, a

·
11'ke
limited partnership is capable of suing and being sued JUSt

· dividu:
In this sense, then, a partnership is like an in
. .
residen:
a corporation or other organization which is a citizen, a
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or a domicile of a particular jurisdiction.

Because the partnership

is like a person, the general rules regarding in personam jurisdiction over persons living within the territory of the jurisdiction are applicable to this partnership.

One court states

these rules as follows:
"The general rule is, that every country has jurisdiction
over all persons found within its territorial limits, for
the purposes of actions in their nature transitory. It
is not a debatable question, that such actions may be maintained
in any jurisdiction in which the defendant may be found,
and is legally served with process. However transiently
the defendant may have been in the state, the summons having
been in the state, the sUI!!IIlons having been legally served
upon him, the jurisdiction of his person was complete .... "
Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 285, 3 So. 321 (1887).
The Appellant herein is not a transient person, but rather
a Utah resident.

Therefore, in accordance.with the general rule,

this state has jurisdiction·because the entity has been legally
served with process within the territorial limits of the state.
That the Appellant is properly subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state is illustrated by a comparison of
this action to "transitory" actions decided in other jurisdictions.
The case of Rubey v. United Sugar Companies, 109 P. 2d 845 (Ariz.
1941), is instructive in this regard.

In Rubey, a suit was filed by the plaintiff in the Superior
Court of Arizona against a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of Mexico.

The plaintiff was

the assignee of a party which entered into a contract with the
defendant.

This contract was executed in the state of California

and affected real property which was located in the Republic
of Mexico.

The contract was to be fully performed in Mexico.
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One of the issues before the court in the plaintiff's action
for a breach of contract was whether the Arizona courts could
properly exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
The Court commented as follows:
"Contracts for the payment of money are E;enerally held t
be transitory, and an action may be brought thereon in~'
court which has jurisdiction of actions of that nature ~~
where proper service can be obtained upon the defendant."
Id., at 847.
The court determined that where proper service of process had
been accomplished, the court not only had jurisdiction of the
subject matter, but also of the person of the defendant.
The action herein is also transitory in that it is an action
for breach of contract and the recovery of money damages.

How-

ever, this action does not seek recovery from a nonresident defer
dant.

The courts of this state clearly have jurisdiction over

the subject matter of such actions and over all persons found
within its territorial limits who have been legally served with
process.
Another case similar to the one at issue is Emerson Quiet
Kool Corp. v. Manuel M. Eskind, 32 ~~isc. 2d 1037, 228 N.Y.S.
2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1957).

This was an action on a contract.

The

plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, brought suit against defend~
a nonresident partnership, for breach of contract.

With respect

to jurisdiction over the defendant, the court stated:
"We are of the opinion under the circumstances here, ~hha~
.
b us iness
is neither p~ is a ' resi. d ent o f or d oing
. . wit
h in
th~ state anatlieagreement was not executed within t.e
state, and there was no personal servi~e i:iad7, ~hat,,th~d.,
designation was ineffectual to confer Jurisdiction.
at 840 (emphasis added).
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The key facts of this case were that neither party was a
resident or doing business within the state and further that
there was no personal service upon the defendant.

In the present

case, the Appellant is a Utah resident and a creature of Utah
law in the sense the New York court treated a partnership as
a resident.

In addition, personal service has been accomplished

in this state.
In addition to the above mentioned basis for establishing
jurisdiction over the Appellant, Appellant by its own admission

-

has revealed that it does business within the state of Utah.
The affidavit of the president of Lancer Industries, Inc., the
corporate general partner of Synergetics, the Utah limited partnership, reveals that both Lancer and Synergetics have been the
object of correspondence

~n

this state from other .jurisdictions

with regard to the business of the partnership (R. 49).

Thus,

not only is the partnership a Utah limited partnership, but its
corporate general partner's president maintains a permanent residence
within this state from which he conducts the business of the
partnership via the mail.

This establishes an additional basis

for jurisdiction over the Appellant.
Finally, Respondent must reply to Appellant's detailed references
to the metamorphosis of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation.

Specifically, Appellant places great emphasis on

the case of Hill v. Zale, 25 Ut. 2d 357, 482 Pac. 2d 332 (1971).
This case made an analysis of how jursidiction is acquired over
nonresidents and quoted the Utah long-arm statute which provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-7digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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: . : that
t~e public interest demands the state provide .
citizens with
an effective means of redress against nonlts.
11
persons ....
78-27-22 T!tah Code Annotated (1953) (~
added) .
' empnasis11

It must be pointed out that the Hill case and the Utah lo
-ng.
arm statute are by definition inapplicable as authority in decidi:
the jurisdictional issues of this case.

The long-arm statute

and the case law under it are meant only to define the scope
of activity of a nonresident corporation which subjects that
corporation to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
The issue here is whether the state of Utah may properly
find that it has in personam jurisdiction over a Utah resident,
a Utah limited partnership which maintains a principal place
of business in this state and which has a general partner which
is a nonresident corporation whose president maintains his perman<
residence within this state and who conducts a portion of the
partnership's business by way of the United States mail.

The

analysis regarding the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonreside1
corporation is misplaced.
The Respondent's position is that the district court proper!;
found that the courts of this state have in personam jurisdiction
over a Utah limited partnership.
POINT II
THE ASSERTION OF IN PERSONA.111 JURISDICTIOU BY THE
STATE OF UTAH WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL.
It would be constitutional to litigate this matter in the
State of Utah and assert in personam jurisdiction over a Utah
hardship and inconvenie;
resident despite Appellant's assertion Of
onvenii:
In reality, Appellant is rearguing the issue of ~ ~ ~
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which has already been decided by this court.

Sulllilla Corporation

::'..:.-Lancer Industries, Inc., an Illinois corporation, and the
General Partner of Synergetics, a Utah limited partnership, 599
P. Zd 544 (Ut. 1977).

In discussing the issue of hardship and

inconvenience with respect to these parties, the court stated
as follows:
"I_he main justification for defendant's /Synergetics7motion
to dismiss appears to be the logistics o-r-arranging-for
testimony, and/or deposition of witnesses from Florida and
California. As opposed thereto, to be taken into account
and in connection with what should be the Plaintiff's prerogative of selecting the court where it could and has obtained
jurisdiction over the Defendant, Plaintiff makes the further
cogent arguments that in this lawsuit, which involves only
$16,000.00, it has already gone to considerable trouble
and expense in engaging counsel, initiating and getting
the action underway here; and that the dismissal would put
it to the necessity of again going through this total process, in another state, which would be an unreasonable burden
upon it." Id., at 547.
In thus balancing the factors weighing for and against the
relative hardship and inconvenience to the parties, the court
held that the greater hardship would be upon the Respondent,
Summa Corporation.

The cost of transporting witnesses either

from Florida to Utah or from Utah to Florida is approximately
the same.

The cost of feeding and sheltering each witness and

the cost of ~an-hours lost over the duration of the trial is
also approximately the same for each witness.

Although Appellant

has asserted that it will be unable to enforce a right of contribution against others in a Utah court (R. 9), it has admitted in
its brief that it will be able to enforce a right of contribution
in a Florida court.
There is certainly no inconvenience to the local court system

state
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an interest in the welfare of its residents that is
by the Defendant's desire to litigate elsewhere.

not overcome

Th

e local inte:,
in the residents' welfare is recogn;zed
;n
th
...
...
e cases in which

the Plaintiff is a resident.

See_ Thompson v. Continental Ins~

Company, 66 Cal. 2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104, 427 P. 2d 76 ,
5
768 (1967); Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 481, 485,
47 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204, 407 P. 2d 1, 4 (1965); Hadler v. Western
Grayhound Racing Circuit, 34 Cal. App. 3d 1, 109 Cal. Rptr. 502
(1973).

There is no good reason to say that the state's interes:.

in its residents is any less because the resident is a Defendant
and not a Plaintiff.

This interest of the state should overcome

any claim by Appellant that litigating the claim against it in
its state of residence is an imposition or a burden upon the
jurisidiction of the courts of this state.
The entire tenor of Appellant's argument with regard to
Point II is founded upon principles of forum

~

conveniens.

The difference between the doctrines of in personam jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens has been perceptively commented on by
the Idaho Supreme Court in a recent decision wherein that court
concluded that a lower court had improperly dismissed a case
for lack of in personam jurisdiction upon the principle of~
non conveniens.

The court stated as follows:

"In ruling on Biehl' s motion to dismiss, the trial court
utilized
forum non conveniens analysis and concluded. that
in light of the disputed facts, this case shoul~ b7 t~i~d
in Michigan. This approach was incorrect. Jurisd1cti~
refers to the power of a court to decide disputes and 0
compel parties to come before it, Black's ~aw Dictionar~,
4th ed. , which is different fr<;>m th~ qu~stion. of whe~~smiss
suit should be tried. Faced with Biehl s motion to

a
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in this 7ase, it was incumbent upon the trial court to determine
whether it had power to.h~a7 Marco's complaint, and could
not escape t~at responsibility by asserting that the case
should be tried elsewhere." Marco Distributin~ Inc v
Brent Biehl, 97 Idaho 853, 857-8, 555 P. Zd 39 ; 397.(1976).
Likewise in this case, Appellant's approach is misplaced.
The arguments made under Point II deal with the issue of forum
non conveniens and not with the issue of the power of this court
to decide a case involving its resident.

Assertion of jurisdiction

over the resident Appellant in this action would be clearly constitutional.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN PROPERLY SERVED AS REQUIRED
BY PULE 4(e)(4) U.R.C.P.
Rule 4(e)(4) U.R.C.P. provides as follows:

Personal service

within the state will be as follows:
"4(e)(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided
for, upon a partnership, or other unincorporated association
which-rs-sU'bject to suit under a coIImJon name, ~delivering
~ ~ thereof to ~officer, ~managing.~ general agent,
or to any other agent authorized by appointment of law to
receive service of process .... " (Emphasis added.)
In accordance with the terms of this rule, Plaintiff served
the partnership by delivering the sununons and complaint to its
general agent, i.e. its corporate general partner, by means of
personal service on the president of said corporate general partner
who is a permanent resident of the state of Utah.
Section 48-2-26 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides
with respect to limited partners as follows:
"A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is no~ a
proper party to proceedings by or against.a.partnership 1
except where the object is to enforce a lim~te~ partner s
right against or liability to the partnership.
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The obvious inference from this provision is th t th
a
e general
partner is a proper party to proceedings against a pa r t ners hip.
Therefore, because Lancer Industries, Inc., is a general partner
of this limited partnership, and because its president is a perma:
ent resident of the state of Utah, service was made upon the
president of said corporation.

Rule 4(e) (4) provides that a

partnership is properly served by delivering a copy of the complai
and summons to a managing or general agent of the partnership.
Certainly the corporate general partner would be considered to
be the managing or general agent of the partnership.

Certainly,

where said corporation does not designate a party to receive
service of process in a jurisdiction, its corporate president
who permanently resides there would be a proper party to receive
service.

Otherwise the corporation could simply avoid all servk

of process by not providing for an agent.
The requirements of Rule 4(e) (4) have been fulfilled complet
Therefore, the motion to quash the service of process upon W. A.
Bailey, corporate president of Lancer Industries, Inc., was prope:
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant is a Utah limited partnership and a Utah resiOi
which maintains a principal place of business in this state.
The president of the corporate general partner of this Utah li.ntiti
partnership maintains his permanent residence within the state
and conducts a portion of the partnership business through the
· a trans:·
use of the United States mails. The action sued upon i-s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
-12- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

action which may be maintained in this state by virtue of the
residency of this limited partnership and service of process
in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because

Appellant was properly served in accordance with said rules,
the Third Judicial District Court properly denied Appellant's
motion to quash service of process and to dismiss for lack of
jursidiction.
Respectfully submitted,
FOX, EDWARDS & PLUMB

LJclf~t(V

Walter J. Plumb III
Attorney for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

....,

CERTIFICATE OF 't-"..AILING
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 1977,

r

mailed two copies of the foregoing brief to John L. McCoy of
Ryberg

& McCoy, attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, 325 South

Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

